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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTERGOVERNmENTAL TAX IMMUNITY-PRIVILEGE
TAX MEAsuRED BY SALwS-[North Dakota] .- Plaintiff, federal land bank,
bought gasoline subject to a North Dakota license tax measured by three
cents per gallon sold. Plaintiff instituted action for a declaratory judgment
on validity of inclusion of the tax in the price of sale. Held, the tax may
be included since its imposition is not a state interference with a federal
function.1
The instant case is the second state decision 2 within the last two years
refusing to follow Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi.3 The Panhandle case
held by a five to four decision that inclusion of a privilege tax, measured by
sales, in the price of gasoline sold to the coast guard and a veteran's hos-
pital retarded and impeded exertion of national power and was therefore
invalid. It relied heavily on the strictness of the application of the doctrine
of M'Culloch v. Maryland4 in Gillespie v. Oklahomas but the Gillespie case
has since been expressly overruled.0 This, together with recent decisions
repudiating the immunity of governmental employees from income taxes,7
is used in the instant case as the basis for considering the Panhandle case
overruled in effect. A practical burden rationale is invoked: the tax is
found to be incidental to the activities of the land bank, and to be no
attempt to "retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control the operation
of" the federal land bank.
The other state validation of a privilege tax on sale of personal property
to a federal land bank arose in California.8 It relied on the construction of
the tax, as not imposed on the sale, but as a property or excise tax payable
by an independent contractor on a sale to the government, and so controlled
by James v. Dravo Contracting Co.9
It may be questioned whether the problem can be side-stepped by refusing
to acknowledge that the tax, whether on unit of merchandise sold or gross
receipts, is levied on the sale. The issue of whether a sales tax, short of a
discriminatory one, creates a burden on the purchaser government goes to
1. Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. De Rochford (N. D. 1939) 287
N. W. 522.
2. The first was Western Lithograph Co. v. Board of Equalization
(1938) 11 Cal. (2d) 156, 78 P. (2d) 731.
3. Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi (1928) 277 U. S. 218. In Western
Union Telegraph Co. v. Texas (1882) 105 U. S. 460, a Texas occupation
tax, measured by messages sent by a telegraph company, was held invalid as
state regulation of interstate commerce; as to government messages it was
held a tax on means employed by the government. As to the effect of basing
measure of tax on tax-exempt scources, cf. Educational Films Corp. v.
Ward (1931) 282 U. S. 379.
4. M'Culloch v. Maryland (U. S. 1819) 4 Wheat. 316.
5. (1922) 257 U. S. 501.
6. Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp. (1938) 303 U. S. 376.
7. Helvering v. Gerhardt (1938) 304 U. S. 405; Graves v. New York
ex rel. O'Keefe (1939) 306 U. S. 466.
8. Western Lithograph Co. v. Board of Equalization (1938) 11 Cal.
(2d) 156, 78 P. (2d) 731. This case overruled a previous decision of a
California district court. West Co. v. Johnson (1937) 20 Cal. App. (2d)
95, 66 P. (2d) 1211.
9. (1937) 302 U. S. 134.
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the heart of the problem. Conceptually, the mere incidence of a tax on the
other government may be a burden on it, and this was the view of the
earlier cases. Realistically, there would seem to be no burden unless the
amount of the tax is unduly onerous.' 0 Through the incidence" on the
federal government of the taxes in question may be clear, their impeding
and retarding effect on it is not as evident because it creates no onerous
financial burden.12 Therefore, the taxes in the instant case and the Western
Lithograph Co. case' 3 are to be invalidated, the decisions must rest on the
basis of their incidence." V.K.
FEDERAL PROCEDuRE-FOREIGN CORPORATIONS-WAIVER OF VENUE BY CON-
sBNT-[United States].-Citizens of New Jersey brought suit in a federal
court in New York to restrain a Delaware corporation there doing business
from carrying out a contract. Service was had upon an agent which the
corporation had appointed according to a New York statute. Defendant
appeared specially and moved to quash service because it was not a resi-
dent of the district. Plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court of the United
States. Held,' judgment reversed. The appointment by a corporation of
an agent as required by the New York statute constituted waiver of the
venue provision of the Judicial Code.2
The history of foreign corporations in federal courts has been marked
by changing attitudes. In 1789, 3 the original Judiciary Act was passed
requiring suit to be brought in the district where defendant was an inhabi-
tant or in which he could be found. In order to permit a corporation to
sue, it was necessary for the Supreme Court in 18094 to decide that citizen-
10. This is the reasoning behind Mr. Justice Holmes's classic statement
in Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi (1938) 277 U. S. 218,223, that "The
power to tax is not the power to destroy while this court sits." See also
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Graves v. New York ex
rel. O'Keefe (1939) 306 U. S. 466, 487.
11. "The settlement of the burden on the ultimate taxbearer is spoken
of as the incidence of the tax." Lutz, Public Finance (2d ed. 1929) 317.
12. The lack of an actual financial burden may have been the basis for
the decision in Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe (1939) 306 U. S. 466.
"In no case is there basis for the assumption that any such tangible or
certain economic burden is imposed on the government." 306 U. S. at 486,
487. See also Helvering v. Gerhardt (1938) 304 U. S. 405, 421, "When
immunity is claimed from a tax laid on private persons, it must clearly
appear that the burden upon the state function is actual and substantial,
not conjectural."
13. Western Lithograph Co. v. Board of Equalization (1938) 11 Cal.
(2d) 156, 78 P. (2d) 731, cited supra, note 8.
14. Lack of incidence might have been the controlling consideration in
the Graves case. "That the economic burden of a tax on salaries is passed
on to the employer or that employees will accept a lower governmental
salary because of its tax immunity, are formulas which have not won ac-
ceptance by economists and cannot be judicially assumed." 306 U. S. 466,
484, n. 4.
1. Neibro Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. (1939) 60 S. Ct. 153.
2. Judicial Code (1888) 25 Stat. 433, 28 U. S. C. A. sec. 112.
3. (1789) 1 Stat. 78, c. 20, sec. 11.
4. Bank of the United States v. Deveaux (U. S. 1809) 5 Cranch 61.
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